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INTRODUCTION 
According to R. Michael Fischl, it was the question above—“what do you 
replace it with?”—that “killed” Critical Legal Studies (CLS), an intellectual 
movement that had its origins in the American Legal Realism movement of the 
1930s.2 The “deadly” question did not focus upon the law as politics or on the 
legal indeterminacy thesis connecting legal realism to CLS. Rather, the trouble 
with CLS was that it heavily relied upon deconstruction as a preferred method of 
critique. At least in Fischl’s estimation, CLS scholars spent too little time 
proposing alternatives to challenges they identified as stemming from the whims 
of judges overly influencing the law.3 CLS serves as an important frame of 
 
* Professor and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, University of California 
Irvine, School of Law. BA, JD, University of California, Berkeley; LL.M., University of Wisconsin.  
Thank you to Elizabeth Mertz and Bryant Garth for inviting me to participate in this issue, and the 
editors of the UCI Law Review for their thoughtfulness and patience.  
1. R. Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC. INQ. 779 
(1992) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987)); see also Anthony 
E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 
HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) (specifically criticizing the CLS deconstruction of liberalism, despite the 
concept’s importance to the marginalized). 
2. See ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A 
GREATER TASK 79–208 (1986); Alan Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 5 (1986). 
3. Fischl, supra note 1, at 78. 
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reference, because before New Legal Realism (NLR) emerged as a current 
offshoot of American Legal Realism, CLS and Critical Race Theory (CRT) were 
the prominent descendants of that movement.4 As such, the histories of those 
movements may at least be somewhat instructive for assessing the trajectory and 
efficacy of New Legal Realism. While there has been no formal pronouncement 
regarding its demise, like CLS before it, CRT discontinued the practice of 
routinely meeting as a community of scholars.5 CRT, however, expanded beyond 
Legal Realism and CLS, to focus on racial subordination and the structural 
dimensions of uneven relationships to power. Moreover, work identified as 
belonging to CRT continues to be produced and thrive internationally6 and in 
other disciplines.7 Whatever one thinks about the status of CLS or CRT, the 
commentaries on these projects engage histories spanning over thirty-five and 
twenty-five years, respectively. Just ten years into the development of NLR, there 
is no evidence that one should question its efficacy. Based on these previous 
movements, however, it is not too soon to ask whether the project appears to 
have a fatal discursive leaning like CLS, is morphing from its original Realist roots 
like CRT, or creating a new and different relationship to its generative movement. 
As opposed to CRT, which stretched beyond CLS and its Realist origins by 
reframing discourses of rights and power, the innovation of NLR is more one of 
associations and methods. As two prominent law scholars have opined, NLR as a 
successor movement to Legal Realism is “an effort to understand the sources of 
judicial decisions on the basis of testable hypotheses and large data sets.”8 This 
definition, however, appears too narrow when one considers the description of 
the authors who wrote the Foreword to this collection, who claim the project is 
more broadly “concerned with advancing a constructive relationship between law 
and the social sciences.”9 Even with this focus, there are questions to be explored 
as NLR is a developing and evolving enterprise. While arguments of the kind can, 
 
4. See OSAGIE OBASOGIE, BLINDED BY SIGHT: SEEING RACE THROUGH THE EYES OF THE 
BLIND 183–90 (2014); Mario L. Barnes, “The More Things Change . . .”: New Moves for Legitimizing Racial 
Discrimination in a “Post-Race” World, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2043, 2054–67 (2016) [hereinafter, “The More 
Things Change”]. 
5. See Angela P. Harris, Building Theory, Building Community, 8 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 313–14 
(1999). On the broad differences between CLS and CRT and the conditions that facilitated a break 
between the two movements, see OBASOGIE, supra note 4; CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii–xix (Kimberlé W. Crenshaw et al., eds 1995); 
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward,  
43 CONN. L. REV. 1253 (2010); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race Histories: In and Out,  
53 AM. U. L. REV. 1187, 1191–93 (2004); Barnes, “The More Things Change,” supra note 4. 
6. See, e.g., MATHIAS MÖSCHEL, LAW, LAWYERS AND RACE: CRITICAL RACE THEORY FROM 
THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE 1, 1 (2014). 
7. See Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 1256 (noting CRT has extended its presence into other 
disciplines, to include “education, psychology, cultural studies, political science, and even 
philosophy.”) (citation omitted). 
8. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 
(2008). 
9. See Bryant Garth & Elizabeth Mertz, Foreword. “New Legal Realism at Ten Years and Beyond, 6 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121, 123 (2016).  
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at times, be specious, for some scholars, there is still somewhat of a fascination 
with what aspects of NLR are actually “new.” Though scholars have opined to the 
contrary,10 it seems obvious that early Realists—who sought to identify the gap 
between statements of formal legal rules and the application of those rules in real 
life—would naturally have been quite open to social science data as a tool to assist 
them in their endeavors. One might wonder, however, whether NLR seeks only to 
make this connection explicit, or whether it is interested in a collaboration that will 
extend beyond the core themes of Legal Realism. On the one hand, then, there are 
questions as to precisely what distinguishes the “new” Legal Realism from the 
“old.” Equally important, questions arise as to whether NLR will require certain 
forms of theoretical and methodological coherence11 or whether the project seeks 
to be a loose umbrella formation that welcomes myriad approaches to 
interrogating the vagaries of law. 
Some of the questions posed above are engaged in the diverse collection of 
works amassed here. As such, Part I will assess this work and what it portends for 
the future of NLR. In so doing, the project’s content and context moving forward 
will be a primary focus. For content, for example, it will be interesting to observe 
whether NLR research will foreground a commitment to engage the issues of 
those at the bottom.12 While NLR also gives primacy to “bottom-up” 
approaches,13 this does not necessarily speak to what subjects and issues will be 
 
10. Brian Leiter was an early critic of the revitalization of Legal Realism. When the first 
collection of NLR scholarship was published in the Wisconsin Law Review in 2005, he wrote on his 
Legal Theory blog: “The actual Legal Realists, to be sure, paid homage to the social sciences, even 
adopting the rhetoric of the then-dominant behaviorism (e.g., talk about the ‘stimulus’ of the facts of 
the case), but their actual scholarly practice was almost entirely insulated from the social science of the 
day. . . .” The So-Called “New Legal Realism,” Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports, Jun. 21, 2006, 
http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2006/06/the_socalled_ne.html [https://perma.cc/XBL7-
GCAB]. Others refute the Leiter description of the connection between Legal Realism and empirical 
methods: “Like the original Realists, who also sought to use social science in service of advancing 
legal knowledge, new legal realist scholars bring together legal theory and empirical research to build a 
stronger foundation for understanding law and formulating legal policy.” (citation omitted). 
Howard Erlanger, et al., Foreword: Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 337; see also 
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 2 
(1995) (“The group of scholars that . . . brought the notion of science as an empirical inquiry if not 
into, then at least up against, law was the American Legal Realists.”). 
11. Hunt, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that theoretical and methodological coherence are required 
to sustain a movement). 
12. This type of research was central within CRT and has increasingly been of interest to 
sociolegal scholars. For a foundational articulation within CRT, see Mari Matsuda, Looking to the 
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 398–99 (1987). In the 
presidential addresses of the last three presidents of the Law and Society Association, a similar call has 
been made. See Carroll Seron, The Two Faces of Law and Inequality: From Critique to the Promise of Situated, 
Pragmatic Policy, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 9, 19 (2016) (in particular she spoke of scholars undertaking 
research focused on real world experiences of inequality, pointing to CHARLES EPP, ET AL., PULLED 
OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014) as representative work); Laura 
Gomez, Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 221 (2012); Richard Lempert, A 
Personal Odyssey Toward a Theme: Race and Equality in the United States: 1948–2009, 44 LAW & SOC’Y  
REV. 431 (2010). 
13. Garth and Mertz, Foreword, supra note 9, at 125. 
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researched.14 Additionally, there may be issues related to methods. At least some 
believe NLR’s turn toward empiricism should be about engaging quantitative 
research.15 If this is not the case, which qualitative methods are suitable or 
preferred? 
For context, there are at least two questions worthy of further exploration 
here. First, there is a question as to whether NLR will assess the operation of law 
in diverse domains.16 Second, there is a question as to how much New Realists 
should and will look back as they look forward or how the influence of American 
Legal Realism will be expressed. Beyond NLR’s internal operation, there is also 
the question of collaboration, which will be considered in Part III. Given NLR’s 
focus on social science data, there will be opportunities to engage with other 
burgeoning scholarly movements that seek to test progressive theoretical positions 
through empirical methods. In particular, questions arise as to how NLR will 
engage with such projects as Critical Race Realism17 or Empirical Methods and 
Critical Race Theory (e-CRT).18 As these movements—through their connections 
to CRT—are offshoots of Legal Realism as well, one would imagine there are 
broad opportunities for engagement across the different fields of study. However, 
this remains to be seen, and a central question to consider is how do scholars 
whose work emanates from a common philosophy—but also has developed 
disparate traditions—find each other? I conclude by considering what lessons we 
have learned so far suggest about the future of NLR. 
I. THE “NEW” LOOK OF LEGAL REALISM 
A. Connecting the New to the Old 
In this anniversary moment, two of the pieces in the collection pose 
questions as to the project’s development and, to some extent, address the 
“content” questions raised above.19 In different ways, both Macaulay and Bix 
explore definitions or boundaries for the NLR project, which may push 
 
14. See generally id. at 3–4. 
15. See supra note 8; see also Garth and Mertz, supra note 9 at 125-27. 
16. See Victoria Nourse and Greg Shaffer, Varieties of Legal Realism: Can a New World Order 
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 79–85 (2009). 
17. See CRITICAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW 
(Gregory Parks et al., eds., 2010); Gregory Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUBLIC POL’Y 683, 713–40 (2008). 
18. The e-CRT movement seeks to create a stronger connection between CRT and social 
science research. On its origins, see Osagie Obasogie, Foreword; Critical Race Theory and Empirical 
Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2010); Mario L. Barnes, Empirical Methods and Critical Race Theory: 
A Discourse on Possibilities for a Hybrid Methodology, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 443, 468–71[hereinafter Hybrid 
Methodology]. Two collections of e-CRT writings have been produced. See Symposium, Critical Race Theory 
and Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2010); Symposium, Critical Race Theory and Empirical 
Methods Conference, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2953 (2015). 
19. See generally supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
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supporters to more thoroughly consider how NLR is connected to and moves 
beyond American Legal Realism. 
Macaulay seeks not only to explore a workable definition for NLR, but also 
to engage in a translation exercise. In analyzing NLR’s orientation toward social 
science, Macaulay points out that empirical data does not necessarily seamlessly fit 
within the frameworks of legal domains.20 Nor are legal scholars likely to know 
when a large-scale study or data set includes an important limit or mistake. As 
much, then, as social science studies offer promising tools to investigate legal 
claims, he points out the unique contributions of legal actors and insights from the 
law and society tradition. His point is that empiricists and those trained in law 
both bring skills and knowledge to the NLR project that should be mutually 
respected.21 Returning to a classic Legal Realist commitment, he emphasizes the 
importance of NLR scholars continuing to do gap studies that measure the space 
between law “on the books” and “in action.”22 At bottom, he sees NLR as 
connected to traditional Realism both in its recognition of the types of problems 
that stem from legal doctrine and in how it identifies sites of study. As long as 
legal actors are cautious about accepting the validity of research data and NLR 
maintains a “big tent” approach, he seems hopeful of the possibilities that lie 
ahead for the collaborative enterprise. 
Bix’s contribution is perhaps the most fascinating. In one way, he draws 
historical linkages between approaches to judicial decision making amongst the 
“old” and “new” Realist traditions. He claims to be a supporter of the 
reinvigorated Realist project, while not necessarily accepting a complete 
commitment within NLR to empirical work.23 He also raises the question of what 
it means to be a “new” Legal Realist. Is the methodological commitment the 
central driver of NLR or are “old” Realists included within the NLR tradition 
because of shared beliefs about the operation of law? He also suggests that NLR 
should imagine a role for Realists “old” or otherwise, who do not wish to employ 
empirical methods but may supply fruitful theory engagement to the project. In a 
way, his position mirrors Macaulay’s claim about the utility of legal actors in the 
NLR project, in that he asserts: “My claim is that there is a need for a clearer 
articulation of what is meant by ‘legal or doctrinal explanation,’ and that this 
cannot be done through ever more sophisticated empirical investigations. This is 
an area where legal theory may be helpful.”24 Bix’s questions and suggestions are 
interesting because they, in the very least, infer another important question: Who 
can and should police participation within the NLR project? The answer to this 
 
20. Stewart Macaulay, New Legal Realism: Unpacking a Proposed Definition, 5 U.C. IRVINE  
L. REV. 149 (2016). 
21. I have made this point with regard to the relationship between critical and sociolegal 
scholars. Barnes, Hybrid Methodology, supra note 18, at 476. 
22. Macaulay, supra note 20 at 161. Early realist Roscoe Pound is credited with popularizing 
this framing. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15–17 (1910). 
23. Brian Bix, Doctrine, Data and High Theory, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 137 (2016). 
24. Id. at 145. 
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question may very well be that policing is unwelcomed. It is certainly reasonable to 
reach such a conclusion given the diverse pieces amassed in this collection and the 
broadly inclusive approach NLR scholars have espoused. The answer to such a 
question, nevertheless, will determine the reach and impact of NLR. If one need 
only believe in animating commitments of American Legal Realism to be a 
welcomed fellow traveler, then NLR researchers will likely be very open to 
collaborate with scholars from other movements descending from American Legal 
Realism, such as CLS, CRT, LatCrit, ClassCrits and other successor movements.25 
This potentiality is considered further in Part III.26 
II.  “DOING” NEW LEGAL REALISM RESEARCH 
The Tejani and Offit articles spend little time exploring the definitional 
contours or efficacy of NLR. Rather, these pieces seem to accept the historical 
origins and current goals of the project as given and attempt, instead, to introduce 
readers to work they surmise as belonging to the NLR project. In this way, these 
projects are representations of what it means to “do” NLR. 
Tejani attempts to construct a Realist intervention into behavioral economics 
and tort theory by suggesting a reinterpretation of concepts of deterrence. 
Specifically, he points out that the “specter of process,” considered to be the 
deterrent effects that stem from fearing the burdens associated with litigation, may 
be as important in tort theory as the “specter of liability,” or the deterrent impact 
of legal liability.27 In support of this claim, the article “examines the thinking 
behind optimal deterrence, including the larger law and economics preoccupation 
with defining social utility as ‘wealth maximization.’”28 The goal was to prove that 
current thinking on liability rules overvalues the “behavioral influence of tort 
litigation.”29 
Offit, by contrast, reports the findings of a study that may be precisely of the 
type NLR progenitors imagined. While it does not involve a quantitative or “big 
data” set, the research focuses on lawyers (U.S. Attorneys) and courts (the voir 
dire process).30 It also involves a fairly robust investigation—an ethnographic 
study, comprised of 132 semi-structured interviews and the observance of thirty-
eight jury selection proceedings.31 Her primary argument is “that prosecutors draw 
on multiple interpretive resources as they seek to compose a jury based on the 
 
25. For a description of these other CLS successor movements, see Barnes, supra note 18, at 
448–49, 449 nn.29, 31–33. 
26. See infra notes 34–57 and accompanying text. 
27. Riaz Tejani, Efficiency Unbound: Processual Deterrence for a New Legal Realism, 6 U.C. IRVINE  
L. REV.207, 216 (2016). 
28. Id. at 210. 
29. Id. at 209. 
30. Anna Offit, Peer Review: Navigating Uncertainty in the United States Jury System, 6 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 169 (2016). 
31. Id. at 172. 
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attributes of jurors.”32 Interpretive tools, in fact, help attorneys assign to jurors 
various attributes and identities. 
These two pieces use myriad methods to demonstrate how understandings 
of the operation of legal rules and practices can be improved through empirical 
work. They do so by complicating understandings of legal theory and demystifying 
precisely how certain legal decisions are made. These pieces are helpful because 
they represent two of many possibilities for “doing” NLR work. These examples, 
however, do not outwardly take up a call to focus on those “at the bottom.”33 
What it would mean for NLR to foreground the concerns of marginalized 
communities within their projects is next considered. 
III.  INCLUDING OR CONNECTING WITH PRESUMABLY COMPATIBLE MOVEMENTS 
In the foreword to this collection, Garth and Mertz clarify that the NLR is 
not just interested in consulting experts to secure the benefits of greater empirical 
insights within law. Rather, the goal is the encouragement of collaborations 
between legal scholars and empirical researchers.34 As NLR is not the only project 
interested in furthering such collaborations, there is a question as to whether 
scholars identifying as subscribing to NLR principles will begin to formally or 
informally align their research with other scholarly movements, thus pushing a 
stronger link between law and social sciences. In particular, nothing in this 
collection of writings speaks to whether NLR scholars will embrace periodic or 
systemic engagements with those working at the intersection of empirical methods 
and Critical Race Theory (e-CRT).35 
The blueprint for e-CRT was laid in working group meetings hosted by 
scholars from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law in 2010 
and 2011.36 The substantive call for the collaboration was issued in the work of 
sociolegal scholars Osagie Obasogie37 and Laura Gomez.38  The resulting e-CRT 
 
32. Id. at 173 (describing the tools as: “(1) probabilistic and evaluative analogies, (2) juror-
types that prosecutors generate from the details of particular, criminal cases, and (3) social and local 
knowledge from prosecutors’ personal relationships and experience outside the courtroom.”). 
33. See supra note 12. 
34. Garth & Mertz, supra note 13. 
35. While both e-CRT and Critical Race Realism (CRR) propose collaborations between law 
and the social sciences, the primary points of difference are that CRR more explicitly references its 
origins in Legal Realism and has a more narrow focus on the connections between race, law and 
psychology. See sources cited supra note 17. Given e-CRT’s broader emphasis, it will be considered 
here. 
36. See Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE 
L. REV. 183 (2013); Barnes, supra note 18, at 447. 
37. See sources cited supra note 36; see also Osagie K. Obasogie, Race in Law and Society, in RACE 
LAW AND SOCIETY 445 (Ian Haney-Lopez ed. 2006) (a study, following up on the earlier work of 
Laura Gómez, finding that race was a little studied topic in leading law and society journals). 
38. Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and Society and 
Critical Race Theory, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 453 (Austin Sarat ed., 
2004) [hereinafter A Tale of Two Genres] (discussing that sociolegal scholars rarely considered race in 
their research, and presenting data that leading sociolegal journals rarely published articles on race); 
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scholarship was supposed to acquire its theoretical orientation from CRT, but also 
“embrace[] the methodological contributions of social science research.”39 
In some ways, NLR and e-CRT appear to be natural allies. First, both begin 
with theoretical commitments forged from the tradition of American Legal 
Realism. CRT, of course, famously split with CLS—the direct successor 
movement to Legal Realism—but that split was significantly related to the CLS 
critique of rights40 and failure to fully account for the effects of racial 
subordination.41 To the extent NLR is animated by concerns with judicial decision 
making and measuring the “on the books” versus “in action” gap in law’s 
operation, e-CRT devotees are unlikely to find this orientation a problem. 
That NLR and e-CRT have a common source of philosophical 
underpinning, however, does not mean that interactions will be seamless. A 
number of potential pitfalls are apparent. First, as indicated above, CRT has been 
chiefly and deeply committed to articulating and seeking redress for issues of 
persons at the bottom.42 NLR research has demonstrated a similar focus within 
some of its projects. For example, in the first collection of NLR articles, rich and 
probing work by scholars such as Thomas Mitchell, Devah Pager, and Guadalupe 
Luna clearly engaged subjects and subject matters for which interrogating societal 
vulnerability and legally-sanctioned inequality figured prominently within their 
analyses.43 Additionally, nothing that has occurred within the last ten years 
suggests that current NLR scholars would find these projects or their 
commitments to be problematic in any way. As such, one would imagine that 
collaborations between NLR and e-CRT would naturally emerge, as some overlap 
exists, at times, in a common focus upon inequality and the subjects/populations 
studied. The concern is that at this point there is no way of knowing to what 
extent orientations that are foundational within e-CRT will continue to 
significantly animate future NLR projects. Mine is not a claim about the 
motivations of NLR researchers, moving forward, but that when measuring 
various forms of disadvantage is not consistently made a core and concrete tenet 
of a project, we are again likely to see the dearth of race-focused research Osagie 
 
Gómez, supra note 12 (encouraging a more meaningful and structured engagement between critical 
race and sociolegal work in her Law and Society Association Presidential Address). 
39. Obasogie, supra note 36, at 185. 
40. See Barnes, “The More Things Change,:” supra note 4, at 2054–55; Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 
1295, Obasogie, supra note 37, at 456. 
41. See Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1356–57 (1988). 
42. See supra note 12. 
43. See, e.g., Thomas Mitchell, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 557 (a quantitative and qualitative look into 
the systematic dispossession of land from among rural black landowners); Deva Pager, Double Jeopardy: 
Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617 (presenting her research findings on the effects of 
incarceration in the labor market, which indicated that Blacks without convictions were less successful 
job seekers than Whites with them); Guadalupe Luna, Legal Realism and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo: 
A Fractionalized Legal Template, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 519 (suggesting how shifting legal interpretations of 
Mexican and Spanish law, thwarted property ownership claims of Chicanos in the U.S.). 
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Obasogie and Laura Gomez observed within sociolegal journals.44 At such time as 
the research does include a long-term focus on inequality, it will still be necessary 
to mind Professor Gomez’s caution that the concept of race be embraced in all its 
complexity and not be treated as “an easily measurable independent variable.”45 
A second issue draws on Macaulay’s thoughts on empirics potentially 
alienating lawyers and other legal actors.46 Similar concerns exist for potential e-
CRT/NLR collaborations. As I have written elsewhere in describing the nature of 
the relationship between critical and sociolegal scholars working on e-CRT 
projects, mutual respect will ultimately determine the efficacy of interdisciplinary 
collaborations.47 Macaulay references both the unique contributions and limits 
arising from lawyers working with researchers. To this mix, one will need to add 
CRT theories and methods—such as narrative or storytelling48—which may 
present challenges to NLR scholars with no background in the relevant 
literatures.49 
A larger issue may exist around the hardest fought battles over introducing 
empirical methods into CRT work, which have centered on the research 
component being regarded as incompatible50 or accorded too much weight. As 
relying upon social science studies is the major point of emphasis within NLR, it is 
not clear how skepticism about methods or the validity of findings among critical 
scholars will play with social scientists.51 Finally, the most difficult challenge for e-
 
44. See sources cited supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
45. Gomez, A Tale of Two Genres, supra note 38, at 455. 
46. See McCaulay, supra note 20. 
47. See Barnes, Hybrid Methodology, supra note 18, at 476. 
48. On CRT’s use of narrative, see OBASOGIE, supra note 5, at 197; RICHARD DELGADO AND 
JEAN STEFANCIC, Legal Storytelling and Analysis, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY AN INTRODUCTION 43–
53 (2d ed. 2012); Mario L. Barnes, Black Women’s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating the Power of 
Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 941, 951–58 (2006); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and 
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413–15 (1989); Nancy Levit, Reshaping the 
Narrative Debate, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 751, 755–58 (2011); Rachel Moran, The Elusive Nature for 
Discrimination, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2365, 2378–81 (2003). 
49. On the centrality of storytelling to CRT and the issue it raises for a wider collaboration 
with the social sciences, see Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social 
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 161–62 (2014). NLR Scholars, have embraced narrative 
scholarship and its articulation within CRT in some of their scholarship. See, e.g., John M. Conley, 
Tales of Diversity: Lawyers’ Narratives of Racial Equity in Private Firms, 31 L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 831 (2006) 
(qualitative research employing narratives that was first presented at the NLR conference at the 
University of Wisconsin in 2004); Arthur F. McEvoy, A New Realism for Legal Studies, 2005  
WIS. L. REV. 433, 438–39 (discussing the LL.M. thesis of Mario Barnes, The Stories We Did Not Tell: 
Race, Family Silences and the Legal Recreation of Inequality—a work employing CRT understandings of 
storytelling—as work that is also representative of NLR). 
50. The potential incompatibility of empirical methods, more generally, and CRT is excellently 
detailed in a recent article. See Carbado & Roithmayr supra note 49, at 150, 155–60 (noting that CRT 
rejects the following positions that are central to social science methods: (1) the merits of objectivity 
and neutrality; (2) frameworks that instantiate disadvantage such as colorblindness and intent norms 
for discrimination; and (3) the understanding of racial bias as being created through individual 
behavioral rather than structural forms of disadvantage). 
51. It should be noted that this concern is one that creates issues within e-CRT, not just 
across potential e-CRT/NLR collaborations. 
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CRT/NLR collaborations may be that both movements are quite young and still 
attempting to define the work that belongs to each enterprise. NLR and e-CRT 
have structured themselves around theoretical commitments and a belief in the 
value of interdisciplinary collaboration. Neither movement has, however, 
articulated terribly specific limits on representative work.52 At this point, e-CRT is 
still conducting a yearly working group and has just published its third collection 
of representative scholarship within four years.53 NLR appears to meet less often, 
but may have a greater sense of what it means to “do” NLR.54 As two “big-tent” 
structures with porous boundaries and no policing or enforcement bodies or 
standards, the best way to further collaboration is to foster openness across e-
CRT/NLR conferences and other intellectual gatherings.55 In particular, it would 
be helpful to identify neutral institutional sites for more longstanding 
engagements. Organizations such as the American Bar Foundation (ABF) and 
Law and Society Association (LSA),56 for example, are likely to welcome 
collaborations between and across e-CRT and NLR scholars.57 
 
52. See Barnes, Hybrid Methodology, supra note 18, at 447–48 (stressing the difficulty in 
understanding the hallmarks of work to be included within e-CRT); Garth & Mertz, supra note 13, at 
(explaining there have been sharp divisions over how to incorporate empirical methods into law, but 
that more recently debates have concerned “how and when to combine particular methods”). 
53. See Barnes, Hybrid Methodology, supra note 18, at 446–48. The last two e-CRT working 
groups met in Wisconsin in October 2015 and at Yale Law School in November of 2016. For the 
2015 conference, see Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW 
SCHOOL, INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL STUDIES, Oct. 9–10, 2015, 
http://law.wisc.edu/ils/2015lawreviewsymposium/index.html. For the 2016 conference, which was 
joined with a public conference discussing the legacy of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), 
see Forty Years After Washington v. Davis: Legal and Empirical Implications, YALE LAW SCHOOL, 
Nov. 18-19, 2016, http://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/barnes/Washington-v-Davis-
Poster_Yale_e-CRT.pdf. 
54. Garth & Mertz, supra note 13, at 131-34 (describing seven tenets observable in the 
published NLR work). 
55. This should be achievable, as e-CRT, is after all, a hybrid formation at the intersection of 
multiple disciplines, see Barnes, Hybrid Methodology, supra note 18, and NLR previously engaged in joint 
meetings in 2007 and 2008 with another CLS splinter movement—Feminist Legal Theory. See The 
New Legal Realism Project, U. WIS. L. SCHOOL, https://law.wisc.edu/ils/newlegal.html (last visited  
pMar. 30, 2017).  
56. This role for LSA was proposed previously by scholars seeking an opportunity for CRT 
scholars to engage with law and economics scholars. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law 
and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003). Both the ABF and LSA welcome 
collaborations between legal and sociolegal scholars. In fact, LSA already has formed a Collaborative 
Research Network (CRN) for each enterprise. CRN 12—Critical Race and the Law—is the home for 
many e-CRT scholars and scholarship. The same is also true of CRN 28—Realist and Empirical 
Methods—and NLR. See Garth & Mertz, supra note 13, at 122. 
57. Just prior to the publication of this volume, it was announced that the Northwestern 
Pritzker School of Law, the school that houses the American Bar Foundation, will host the 2017 e-
CRT working group. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Afterword began with a question related to the so-called demise of CLS, 
one of the significant scholarly movements to emanate from American Legal 
Realism. While it is likely erroneous to suggest that the theories and knowledge 
production tied to CLS ever perished, the movement itself did stall. To the extent 
it was the project’s penchant for deconstruction that facilitated its “death,” CLS 
might have also represented a cautionary tale for CRT and other successor 
movements. While CRT too engaged in deconstruction and abandoned its yearly 
workshops, it also engaged in positive theory building, sustained the production of 
a diverse range of scholarship, and was celebrated by a large number of involved 
scholars at a twenty-year anniversary conference in 2009.58 CRT has also, itself, 
produced successor movements such as LatCrit and e-CRT. Through its meetings 
and publications over the last ten years, NLR too has existed as an ongoing 
concern. The fear, then, is not really that these movements will cease to exist in 
the near term. The goal moving forward, however, should be to define the 
conditions under which they shall continue to flourish. 
For NLR, the work in foundation building seems largely complete. NLR has 
a well-established philosophy and a set of tenets that help to mark the project’s 
commitments for interested participants. Yes, there are still internal questions—
some of which are engaged in work published here.59 The larger challenges with 
which I am concerned do not relate to drawing lines between precisely what is 
“new” and “old” in NLR, or otherwise policing additional internal issues. Rather, 
my concerns regarding what NLR can and will become center on to commitments 
animating its research and its openness to collaborations with other scholarly 
movements. Here, I have suggested a sustained focus on the plight of those at the 
bottom within the research and working more intentionally with movements of 
similar or common origin, such as e-CRT. While neither of these circumstances 
will arise without deliberate actions on the part of NLR scholars, the potential 
benefits could be great for the legal subjects whose issues will be explored and the 
scholars involved. Such collaborations will also produce challenges. There is no 
reason to believe, however, that they will be insurmountable. As the authors of the 
Foreword to the first collection of NLR scholarship opined, such interdisciplinary 
collaborations can succeed, but must be mindful of meaningful differences across 
“epistemology, methods, operating assumptions, and overall goals” that may 
exist.60 
 
58. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Celebrating Critical Race Theory at 20, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1497, 
1497–98 (2009); Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 1311. 
59. As discussed above, there are still questions over how legal actors will engage empirical 
work, whether there was a role for those not embracing empiricism, and what types of methods will 
be employed. See supra notes 44–52 and accompanying text. 
60. See Erlanger et al., supra note 10, at 336. 
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